

HOPPER BRUCE
C.
(CONT'D)

S E C R E T

OSS/BLA New Delhi Office

III ECONOMICS3.0.

Oil tanks and the small refineries might be successfully approached with timed explosive charges. While the larger tanks and plants would be closely guarded, the smaller ones might be more vulnerable.

M.O.

Another case of automatic sabotage which can be fostered by suitable encouragement is the theft of oil from the pipe line by villagers in the vicinity of the line. This goes on anyway, and the leakage could quite probably be increased.

The present food situation in Burma intensifies Japanese vulnerabilities of previous months. One of the major grievances against the Japanese is still the depletion of stocks of food as a result of Japanese troops living on the country. The shortage of plough cattle, often blamed on the Japanese, is another point on which many villagers feel keen resentment against the Japanese. The lines of approach to these vulnerabilities have been extensively discussed in previous memoranda.

SECRET

OSS/Rea New Delhi Office

M.U.

In Myingmye near Bhamo there are between 60 and 100 river motor boats, each capable of carrying from 10 to 14 men. They are all of one type and are believed to have been imported by the Japs. They have Japanese crews and are kept in the creek outside the Roman Catholic Church at Myingmye.. They are sometimes moved to Inna Village (16° 54" North, 95° 07" East).

S E C R E T

U.S. AIR FORCE

are formed in columns of four until shortly before departure, when they are allowed to buy tickets. There are separate queues for men and women. Tickets are sold in the proportion of two men to one woman.

It is not possible to make a through booking to a station beyond a trans-shipping point, and so it is not possible to book from Rangoon to Moumein.

Moumein

Passengers for Moumein detrain at Nyanngkashu, then walk three miles to the river and cross by sampan ferry, walk one mile to Hekpalin, then take another ticket to Martaban and finally cross the river to Moumein.

Prome

The Prome railway station is not in use. There is one train per day. Tickets are purchased as usual. No special pass is required.

The trains generally travel only in the evening, night and early morning. Halts are made during the day. The Hensada train left at 2000.

An earlier report indicated that the train from Rangoon to Prome leaves Rangoon at 1600 and arrives at Prome at 0600 the next day. The Rangoon train from Prome usually comprises two coaches for troops, two for civilians, and about 14 wagons for supplies.

Bassein

There is only one train per day each way between Hensada and Bassein. This runs at night, leaving Bassein between 1800 and 1900. The reverse timings are not known.

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OSS/MA New Delhi Office

S.I.

A report of December states that the route from Siam to Burma by the Rahong-Mehgot-Kawkarok road is largely used by smugglers and is not used by troops. This information is from an Indian trader engaged in smuggling piece goods. Both the route and personnel which habitually traverses it might be utilized.

The following information concerns current railway timings and passenger procedure:

Mandalay

Although this station still serves as terminus, the majority of passengers from Mandalay entrain at Shanau or Myohaung. The scheduled times of arrival and departure of certain trains are: -

From Mandalay to Lashio - arrivals at Lashio at 0900, 1100, 1500, 2300

From Lashio to Mandalay - departures at 0800, 1100, 1400, 1800

Namtu to Nam Yao - departure 0900, arrival 1500

Nam Yao to Namtu - departure 1400, arrival 1800

There is no fixed time of arrival or departure of trains between Rangoon and Mandalay. Between these places two trains run daily in each direction.

The above information, published on December 30, 1943, may possibly date back to April 1943.

Rangoon

Reliable information up to early December 1943.

The Rangoon station is working on all platforms. Rangoon travellers must have inoculation certificates before they can obtain tickets. They queue up for inoculation, then

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II COMMUNICATIONSS.O.

The inability of air attacks to put any permanent crimp in the Burma railway system indicates that a great deal of useful work on railroad installations and bridges can be done from the ground. The destruction of 20 locomotives at the right time might mean a great deal, in view of the paucity of Japanese storage dump facilities up country. Rail mines of the proper type would lend themselves naturally to a locomotive operation. Fuel dumps, mostly wood supplies for locomotives, are stacked at numerous points; a few suitably prepared sticks of plastic inserted in a place of wood might well wreck a boiler. The railway which supplies the 54th Division in the Bassein area evidently has only two locomotives; it would be useful to put them out of action. The Burma-Siam line has over 100 bridges more than 80 feet in length; facilities for servicing locomotives and rolling stock and for maintaining this line are poor.

REF ID: A67

CIS/AF. New Delhi Office

O.G.

Three Radar installations have recently been reported in enemy territory, at Rangoon, at Moulmein, and in the Andamans. These installations are probably used for gun laying or aircraft control or both. The accuracy of A/A over Rangoon implies that some type of gun laying equipment is in use. Although the Rangoon installation may be impractical as a target, the Andaman station, and others which may be in operation, might usefully be attacked.

A task force, under cover of night, could knock out the station; our air force might then come over, and after bombing pick up the group.

Bands of JIFs (Japanese Inspired Fifth Columnists) are being of considerable aid to the enemy on all Burmese fronts. Their movements are difficult to follow, and they throw in substantial reinforcements at unexpected points although their staying power is not great. These groups have combined intelligence and combat functions. Perhaps the best way to countermand their effectiveness would be to set up task groups of our forces to operate against them in regions where they are known to be located.

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3.

There have been reports that all Japanese in the Taro area, and in other parts of the attacking front, are carrying gas masks. This is the first report of the enemy carrying gas masks anywhere in Burma and Thailand. Efforts made to obtain more information on enemy chemical warfare equipment would be useful.

In the morning of 10 October, the enemy succeeded in surprising our forces. Although it is known that at least one of the battalions involved in the attack was on the move. Once it is known that a Japanese unit is in transit from a base position, it is imperative to make every effort to track its movements.

SECRET

01/12/61 New Delhi Office

S.O.

There are a number of radio stations in operation along the **Assam-China transport route**. One is reported to be in the Hukong Valley at NE 200N, and there is a broadcasting station with a direction finding loop attachment in the vicinity of Myiththa. These facilities are obviously the transmission of military information and serve as aircraft warning net stations. All intelligence reports state that their operations at night cause most concern to our transports. These stations interfere with our navigation by using the same frequencies as our own stations. Indian bomber pilots then come in on the wrong channel. With conditions of poor visibility, their effectiveness will increase.

The second use of these stations is to serve as night check points for interior aircraft, and as guides for these planes to their bases after night operations.

These installations would make suitable targets for S.O. operations.

In addition to training fronts, the Japanese employ a variety of operatives, organized in various task groups. There is a group of Gurkhas, some of them trained in Rangoon and Penang, who are carrying out front line intelligence tasks. They are stationed at Myitthaingyi. Deserters, renegades, political revolutionaries, are employed both along the fighting fronts and deep into India. Counter intelligence measures are especially difficult, since a great majority of the agents are Indians, many of whom are residents of the regions in which they now operate.

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Government of Free India. Several agents trained in schools at Singapore and Penang were affiliated in this Tanager Institute on their way through, but received no training during their stay.

It can be assumed that the agents released from the Institute will probably be well trained and more capable of carrying out their tasks than have been their predecessors from this and similar training schools.

Another school for agents is under the direction of Babu Amar Singh and is located at Rangoon and Mawlaik. Babu Amar Singh was brought to India by the Japanese from Bangkok to organize their subversive intelligence activities. A training school for about 30 students was started in February or March 1942. At first there was a staff of only two besides the headmaster, one Ghanda Singh, and Ben Lakin. The agents selected were generally of a poor type and the first were given little useful training. Later, the school moved to Mawlaik, and some elementary instruction in bomb making and in small arms was begun.

A number of the agents from this school were sent to Manipur State to contact the ex-royal family and to engage in sabotage, espionage and propaganda against troops and against government employees. The infiltrating parties of this group were provided with guides, residents of the Indo-Burmese frontier area, who had been through the same training as the agents themselves. Some of these guides were supposed to provide communications between the agents and the Japanese. As far as is known, all of the agents of the first batch were arrested before they approached their tasks.

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OSR/BA New Delhi Office

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There are many indications that Japanese trained agents have successfully infiltrated into India, and are active both in sabotage and intelligence operations. Some of the most obvious clues to their activities are the signal fires lit in the vicinity of air bases in anticipation of Japanese air attack, blinker signals from the ground, and enemy broadcasting stations near principal aerodromes. They constitute a security problem of no mean dimensions.

A number of training schools for agents have been established in Burma and Malaya. At first these schools were not very efficacious, but it seems that the training as well as the calibre of the agents has steadily improved.

The "Swaraj Young Men's Training Institute" at Rangoon was started the end of 1942. Its first students came from a previously established school at Penang, and also were recruited in Burma. The school is directed by a seasoned Indian agent, Hari Singh, alias Usman Khan. The training at first was mostly theoretical, emphasizing propaganda, espionage and sabotage, but with little practical training. Some of the students were removed to be used as parachutists and were later dropped into India. Others were assigned to training as radio operators, and a few were returned to Penang for a "submarine and boating course".

In May 1943 about fifty students left the school for deep penetration tasks into India. Only fifteen have been apprehended; very little has been heard of the remainder. Most of them were specially trained in methods of political agitation with a view to working in India. The importance of this Institute is indicated by the visits it received in August, and again in October, from Subash Chandra Bose, the head of the "Provisional

SECRET

15th Division

Depot: Nippon (Kobe?)

First Overseas: 1938

Present Location: Chinawin

This division left Japan in August 1938, took part in the drive on Hangchow and was thereafter stationed in Central China. It was recently transferred to French Indo-China, and in the past weeks has been moving into Burma.

Since most of the 15th has been overseas for nearly six years, the usual attacks are projected which are effective against troops long away from home. This division has apparently never operated against Western troops.

SECRET

15th Division

Dopot: Nagoya and Kyoto (?)

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It has also been mentioned that the use of Chinese guerrillas. Both air strength and guerrilla tactics might be utilized against this division.

The 36th has been in combat against Chinese troops but has had relatively little experience against European troops.

31st Division

Dopet: (?)

First Overseas: 1941

Present Location: Near Shindwin

The 31st Division is a new division. The 58th Regiment is composed of its components. A regiment formerly belonging to the 15th Division and another formerly belonging to the 15th Division. The 15th Division and the 15th Division belong to the latter division. It has participated in the Nanking campaign of 1927, the Shanghai offensive of September 1939, and later Yangtze Valley operations.

54th Division

Dopet: Hiroshima and Hiroji

First Overseas: 1943

Present Location: Southwest coast of Burma.

This division was formed in August 1940 and has only recently been identified in the field. At one time it was believed to be in Western New Guinea, but the latest reports indicate with a fair degree of certainty that the three regiments of this division are now in Burma. It has been overseas for a very limited period and probably has had no experience against either Chinese or Western troops. Its relative greenness provides possibilities for exploitation.

SECRET

CMB/244 D-1 Delhi Office

Since the 53rd was engaged in the first Changsha offensive it would be much interested in the later aspects of this offensive and the recent retirement of the Japanese from their latent "rice bowl" drive. Too much should not be made of Chinese "successes" but the futility of repeated Japanese offensives against the same objective could be stressed.

55th Division

Depot: Zentsuji

First Overseas: December 1941

Present Location: Arakan

The 55th appeared in Burma in December 1941, and the bulk of the division has remained in the country ever since. This division repelled the Allied drive toward Akyab in 1943. The 144th Infantry Regiment and the 55th Mountain Artillery were detached from this division in November 1941 and eventually wiped out in Burma as described above. As with the 10th, the destruction of one of the former regiments of this division could be exploited. The 55th has had experience with European troops, but its experience against Chinese troops has been limited.

56th Division

Depot: Kurume and Kumamoto

First Overseas: May 1942

Present Location: Salween

This unit first appeared during the fighting in Burma of May and June 1942. It has been in the country since, for the most part along its present line.

The 56th was subjected to relatively sharp air attack during its initial operations in Burma and has since undergone fairly steady strafing and bombing from the Allied air forces.

SECRET

OAR/DAI Per Draft Office

Since the 55th was engaged in the first Changsha offensive it would be much interested in the later aspects of this offensive and the recent retirement of the Japanese from their latest "rice bowl" drive. Too much should not be made of Chinese "successes" but the futility of repeated Japanese offensives against the same objective could be stressed.

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56th Division

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Present Location: Salween

This unit first appeared during the fighting in Burma of May and June 1942. It has been in the country since, for the most part along its present line.

The 56th was subjected to relatively sharp air attack during its initial operations in Burma and has since undergone severe losses resulting and resulting from the Allied air forces.

SECRET

078/222 New Delhi Office

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REPORT

OSS/MIA New Delhi Office

It is probable that Hino Aichi, author of Whore and Soldiers, Mud and Soldiers, and other very widely read books was a member of the 10th Division. Several other divisions participated in the Hanchow landings, but the 10th was probably the only one which had its first China service at that time. References in Hino's novels indicate that he was in a division which had not been in China before Hanchow. Hino's novels are well known, and have been undoubtedly read throughout the Japanese Army. It is probable that many of the experiences Hino describes have been shared by Japanese men. His novels provide a wealth of material which can be used with particular effectiveness against the personnel of this formation.

The members of the 10th Division, having had experience in the Southwest Pacific, should be particularly sensitive to news from that zone. As they have had experience against both Chinese and European troops, cognizance should be taken of the fact that they are seasoned soldiers.

33rd Division

Depot: Sendai and Utsunomiya

First Overseas: April 1939

Present Location: Chin Hills; one regiment on the Arakan coast.

This division was located in Kiangsi and Hupeh from August 1939 to November 1941. It took part in the first Changsha offensive of September 1939. In December 1941 it was shifted to Thailand and then went overland to Burma. It reached Rangoon in March 1942 and has since been engaged along the Chinwin and Arakan frontiers.

SECRET

US/UKA New Delhi Office

The Japanese and other Japanese units in Burma provide information. The length of time these divisions have been in Burma, the degree to which they are experienced in jungle warfare, their past successes and failures are factors which can be used to good account. Information on their location in Japan from which a division is recruited provides possibilities of refining M.O. in terms of specific tactics.

The following notes on the divisions now in Burma sketch the salient facts concerning each group; no attempt has been made to list the names of the officers or men but it should be noted that some of this information is available and can be highly useful.

18th Division

Depot: Kumamoto (J)

First Overseas: November 1937

Present Location: Hukawng Valley

After leaving Japan in 1937, this division participated in the landings at Hangchow Bay and the drive on Nanking. They later took part in the occupation of Canton, October 1938, and in the Nanning campaign (Kwangsi) November 1939. The bulk of the division then took part in the Malayan campaign and then was transferred to Burma. The history of the 124th Infantry Regiment, formerly of this division, is given above.

Some parts of the 18th probably participated in the "rape of Nanking". If so, they witnessed the general breakdown in Japanese discipline which occurred at that time. The possibilities of Chinese retaliation against participants in the Nanking outrages might also be used. Some of the 18th will undoubtedly have had personal contacts with members of the 124th who fell at Guadalcanal.

MEMORANDUM

085/000 New Delhi Office

tion, the 11th and 13th. It is probable that the 13th was reestablished in Malaya and arrived in the London region about January 22, 1941.

184th Infantry Regiment, 11st Division (formerly 13th Division)

The 184th took part in the landing at Hongchow Bay (November 1937), at that time being a part of the 10th Division. It subsequently was in action at Hankow, Canton and Nanking (about November 1939).

The 10th Division reappeared in December 1941, during the Malayan campaign, but at that time the 184th was no longer part of the unit. Three regiments of the 10th Division, the 85th, 86th and 114th, landed at Kota Bharu, participated in the Malayan operations and were then utilized in the Burma operations. The Division is at present employed in the Rukhwa Valley.

The 184th met with considerably less success than did the other regiments of the 10th. It left Canton in December 1941 as part of the Japanese Detachment. It took part in operations at Miri and Kuching in Borneo and was in Davao by April 1942. It landed at Mindanao in August 1942.

By February 1943, the 184th, together with the rest of the Japanese Detachment, was virtually annihilated. Remnants of the Regiment may have been re-formed at Truk.

It now appears that the reconstituted 184th has been assigned to the newly activated 11st Division. This division has been identified along the Chinwin and is believed to have been made up of the "spare regiments" of the former square divisions (the 50th from the 13th Division, the 184th from the 10th Division, and probably the 150th from the 11th Division). At present, therefore, both the division to which the 184th was originally assigned and its new unit are in Burma.

OSB/BLA New Delhi Office

NOTES OF INTEREST TO OSS BRANCHES

MILITARY OPERATIONS

220

104th Infantry Regiment, 50th Division

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ONE/NOI Not-Valid Office

APPENDIX

1.2

RUSSIA SITUATION REPORT NO. 1

20 FEBRUARY 1946

1. THE RUSSIAN SITUATION

1.1. Political Conditions

1.2. Economic Conditions

1.3. Social Conditions

1.4. Cultural and Psychological Conditions

SECRET

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Japan gave his Provisional Government sovereignty over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Recently the headquarters of the Provisional Government has been moved from Singapore to Burma. The recent Arakan fighting has been widely heralded throughout the Axis sphere as the first step in Rose's march to Delhi.

The Council of Ministers of this Provisional Government has busily been issuing regulations for the conduct of their subjects: It has been decided that Hindustani shall be the common language of India; "Jai Hind" (victory for India) shall be the common greeting or salutation; the Nationalist tri-color shall be the flag of India; the tiger shall be India's national emblem; standard war cries, slogans, songs and titles have been decreed for the Indian people. Furthermore, a plan for national unification in the matter of food and dress is under consideration and will presumably be announced before long.

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OSS/MAA New Delhi office

Points tending to make the Japanese popular

1. The belief that the Japanese have granted Burma independence.
2. The fact that all officials are Burmese.
3. The comparative ease with which firearm licenses can now be obtained.
4. The way the Japanese fraternize with the people.

There are many thinking Burmans who doubt that the Japanese are sincere about giving them complete independence. The reason for this is that the Burmans cannot understand why the Japanese have sacrificed so many lives to keep the British out of Burma if they intend to give Burma away.

Except for those now working for the Japanese, who for obvious reasons fear the return of the British, the majority of Burmans would be pleased to see the British back. There are many who still talk of the peaceful and pleasant days under British rule and who blame the Japanese for all the hardships they are undergoing.

"PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF FREE INDIA"

Subhas Chandra Bose continues his attempts to rally Indians in East Asia and within India to his banner. On January 25th he gave a summary of the history of his movement during the past months. He told how he had escaped from India and gone to Axis countries in order to see for himself what the state of world affairs was and to decide on whose side he would be. After due observation and cogitation he became convinced that the Axis was bound to win, and so he plunged himself into the work of uniting India with Germany and Japan. His Provisional Government was first set up in Singapore and took over the leadership of the Indian Independence Movement in general, and of India's Army of Liberation in particular. This army is composed of former prisoners of war and some deserters who have been equipped and trained by the Japanese. This Provisional Government of "Azad Hind" was granted formal recognition by Japan and Germany and by some of the Axis satellites. It declared war on Britain and on the U.S. on October 23rd, 1943. By November 16th, according to Bose,

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CDS/ISA New Delhi Office

The Japanese do not Shiko (pay formal obeisance) to the monks. Japanese soldiers are sometimes quartered in Pongyi Kyauangs (monasteries), often do not observe the footwear rule, and even get drunk on the premises at times. The Japanese do not interfere much with the monks themselves; the pongyis travel in trains and buses and are not generally searched. They are shown no favor with regard to the possession of tickets on the railways, so that they normally travel with a young disciple who stands in the ticket queues for them. There is no doubt that the monks still wield enormous influence in Burma, but they are receiving little formal recognition of their potential power from present authorities.

A report of February 15th summarizes psychological factors currently operative in Northwestern Burma. The date of the information is stated to be up to November 1943.

"Grievances against the Japanese"

1. Depletion of stocks of food as a result of Japanese troops living on the country.
2. Frequent calls on villagers to supply labor for the Japanese.
3. Failure of the Japanese during their 18 months of occupation to import essential commodities for civilian needs.
4. Requisitioning of supplies and payment at prices much below market rates.
5. Frequent requisitioning of carts and bullocks.
6. Shortage of plough-cattle as a result of indiscriminate killing by the Japanese.

Villagers have brought these grievances to the notice of the Japanese, but the only answer received so far is that the Japanese troops were undergoing greater hardships than the villagers. Once a month the Japanese convene a meeting of village headmen at which they present their requirements for the month. The headmen are asked whether they can meet the demand and as they dare not refuse, the villagers suffer.

REPORT**ONE/SEA New Delhi Office**

trying to effect further improvements. It must be remembered that Dr. Ba Maw's 'front line' policy is national mobilization, that every person is to work either in the army or in various civilian bodies orientated toward progress and administrative improvement.

To bolster the psychological foundations of his government, Ba Maw employs the whole array of propaganda matter and media. Teams of speakers travel among the villages exhorting the peasants to support the government. By radio, through the press, and on the stage, Ba Maw's administration is portrayed as a model of independent Asiatic government. The Japanese, for their part, play their role as kindly benefactors; they give donations of sizeable sums to worthy causes in Burma, they foster Burmese-Japanese cultural relations in various fields, and they entertain visiting Burmese in Tokyo in lavish style.

But, as Goebbels is discovering, propaganda has no permanent answer to reported bombings and deprivations. There still is a widespread lack of consumers' goods in Burma, and although food supplies in some parts of the country are adequate, none the less the standard of living is not up to what it was before the war. The diurnal appearance of Allied planes overhead in many parts of Burma (although not by any means in all) deeply shakes the confidence of the Burmese concerning an ultimate Japanese victory.

It may be that we have a new potential ally in Burma in the Priesthood. There has been surprisingly little information about the activities of the monks, and from all indications it appears that they have been largely disregarded by the Japanese and by Ba Maw. A Japanese officer's notebook captured in September 1943 said, "The monks have no political influence". It seems sure in that in, these troops do not treat the monks with the respect they are accustomed to receive from the Burmese themselves.

000/224 New Delhi Office

In their reform recently introduced from Hangoon has been a degree of communal responsibility. The whole village is held responsible for the family of one man, and the whole family is responsible for the conduct of one man. Every village is headed under the control of a group leader called a "headman" who is appointed by the village council, and in the village council follow what is considered the proper conduct. The "headman" is held responsible. If the headman does not do his work, he can be sent to the Japanese prison of the headman. This institution of leaders for a village is an old institution in Lower Burma and is well known to the people. The Council formerly functioned as a village council. It is not known if this system has been extended to other parts.

gives the evidence all hand to show that Ba Maw is doing
fairly well in the control and direction of the country. Although
the Japanese domination in the Indo control wherever it suits
their purposes, the British administration of government is
not in such a position as to be able to control the government
and to control the situation in the new regime. A British
policy of limited intervention in the governmental situation in
Burma is not a good idea. It is to be spoken that Burma is a
country which is not a good idea, with the popula-
tion, with the revolt, with the British and

SECRET

OSD/ISA New Delhi Office

abandoned. Since coming campaigns may be fought in this area of great food scarcity, an abundant supply of rice brought in to the region by our forces would be necessary.

OTHER ECONOMIC DATA

Japanese currency notes are in wide use. This does not mean that British currency is not honored, because British five and ten rupee notes are hoarded and a British silver rupee brings from two to five rupees in Japanese paper.

In northern Burma all currency is accepted except British currency above R.100 is not accepted. There is no small currency in common circulation. The hoarding of silver rupees is a good sign to the basic state of mind of the people even during the war. However the Japanese VI Roger may be a result of the return of the previous government, he still has not introduced in Japanese currency issue than is seen in the British rupee or in the silver rupee.

IV. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE

A drastic reorganization of the administrative system of the country was announced from Rangoon on January 18, 1944. It was announced that Burma is to be divided into four large districts of administration, comprising Upper Burma, Middle Burma, Lower Burma, and the Shan States respectively. Each section is to be under the supreme rule of a High Commissioner. The purpose of this new setup is to make each of the four sections practically autonomous in matters of internal administration, with great powers vested in the High Commissioner. The ostensible reasons for this move, as given from official sources, are that the re-organization will lighten the more difficult task of the

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OSD, RMA New Delhi Office

ures into the field of peasant loans have resulted only in a constantly decreasing capital reserve.

A particularly weak aspect of Burmese cultivation at present is the shortage of draught animals. The number of oxen normally available for cultivation has been seriously curtailed by military requisitioning and by epidemics of cattle diseases. The normal import of bullocks from northern Burma is no longer possible and cultivators are very restive about the lack of animals.

The townsman in lower Burma is having great difficulty in obtaining food, other than rice, and has to pay very high prices for what he gets. There has been some effort at price control which, as usual, has led to the flourishing of black markets and to great discontent among merchants who are caught between the fixed selling price and the higher rates they have to pay for goods. There is an especial shortage of cooking oil, which formerly was imported in great quantity from the northern dry zone. Sugar and tea are available, but are very expensive. There has been some importing of cigarettes, medicine, cloth, sugar and tea from the NWI but it is still much less than it was in pre-war days.

In northern Burma the food situation is much more serious than it is in lower Burma. One report says that the price of rice in Mandalay is ten times what it was before the war. Shortages of all foodstuffs and consumers' goods in this region are much more pressing than they are to the South. In the area around Myittha and in the Kukuang Valley cultivation of rice has dropped greatly. Air photographs of November show that the Myittha area has only about one-tenth of the normal cultivation; the Kukuang area only one-eighth. In the Kukuang region of the Kukuang Valley cultivation seems to have been totally

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There has been little change in Burma's food situation over past months. The transport system still cannot satisfy both Japanese military demands and civilian needs; hence, Burma's population suffers from a maldistribution of food. There has been a surplus of rice in the paddy-growing areas of lower Burma. Dr. Maw's government allotted some five million rupees for the purchase of this surplus in order to bolster the market and protect the cultivators. This sum will be just about enough to take the surplus of the 1943 crop off the market.

The next crop, which comes into the market in March 1944, will not be as great as that of the previous year. Reports indicate that there has been a considerable decrease in the area of paddy cultivation. Aerial coverage shows that only about two-thirds of the normal paddy fields are under cultivation. A reliable source inside Burma states that the current crop will be only 40 percent of normal. Both estimates may be near the mark, since bad weather conditions have decreased the normal yield per acre. At any rate, there will be a reduced crop in lower Burma. In view of this, the government of Burma instituted "cultivate more paddy" drive on February 8th. The purpose of this drive is to ensure the production of an adequate quantity of rice, enough for self-sufficiency, for the satisfaction of military needs, and for the development of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The production goal for 1944 is four million tons a year.

Governmental activities in subsidizing the rice market, in issuing loans to cultivators and in re-distributing land, show that Dr. Maw's government is determined to take over the functions which previously had been performed by the Chettiyars, the Indian money lenders and land owners. At the present, Dr. Maw seems to have had considerable success, but in the past, governments vent-

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Photo-reconnaissance of January 13th showed that the DOO main stores yard was practically demolished and that there was probable damage to the distillation plant and the boiler house. The two large tanks at the refinery were undamaged. Photos of February 2nd reveal that a building located between the boiler house and the distillation plant was gutted. In view of past Japanese records in restoring bombed oil installations, it is possible that these plants are now back to partial operation.

A November report stated that the oil pipe line from Yenangyaung to Rangoon was in use, and that theft of oil from the pipe line by villagers is fairly common. Photos of the Tharrawaddy pump station, made on January 13th, reveal extensive reconstruction, especially in the camouflaging of a very large tank. The Tharrawaddy pump station was one of two on the pipe line between the Yenangyaung fields and Rangoon. If the Kanhla pump station is observed in operation, it may be assumed that the pipe line is in service.

Further evidence on the present use of the pipe line lies in the extensive camouflage put over the line where it is visible from the air. There are also indications that the pipe line from Yenangyat to Chauk, North of Yenangyaung, may be in use.

Oil wells on Ramree Island have been developed. A refining plant at Yenandaung on the island produces about 800 gallons of kerosene a day.

A good deal of oil is still transported in drums carried by motor, in country boats, and in railway wagons. Coordinated attacks on the storage tanks, the pipe line, and the refineries would stop many Japanese armored cars and trucks.

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This is only 8.5% of pre-war production, and includes no high test aviation fuel. But the yield is probably adequate for Japanese motor transport requirements in Burma.

The Japanese Army has been able to supply its needs for motor fuel by the use of topping plants and small refineries mostly in the oil fields themselves. These installations were demolished during the evacuation, but were repaired in a matter of months. These small plants distill off the gasoline content from the crude oil. The residual oil and some of the crude is shipped to the large oil refinery near Rangoon. Kerosene, wax products, and oil and low grade lubricating oils are produced. These small refineries have been restored by the Japanese. It is estimated that available tanks own hold 23,763,000 gallons of refined and crude materials.

Only the Thai plant, and the three large Rangoon refineries, is in current operation. Restoration was begun on the Syrian plant, but after a highly successful raid in May 1943 reconstruction was stopped, and the installations have been dismantled and removed. Efforts have been made to keep the drum-making plant at Syrian under production, since Japanese oil has been transported in drums since the evacuation.

There has been a continuing policy of removal at the Salkyi plant, the third of the Rangoon refineries. The parts have probably been removed to the Netherlands East Indies, or to other places in the Japanese sphere. Recently, a considerable quantity of 10" and 12" (used in drilling) oil has been removed from the Rangoon refineries and destined for foreign fields.

Report of R. V. ... indicated that the Yanangyaung field and ... was ... by the Japanese. Our air force ... on January 2nd, and returned ... on the following day.

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River Transport.

The original demolition of river craft, together with air strafing and bombing, has swept the river system bare of large river steamers. According to a recent air intelligence report, the only remaining large paddle steamer now in the possession of the Japanese is the "Kaduma" which is believed to have been inactive as a result of air attack. She was observed at Khodaung on January 9th, but had not been in use for some time.

A list of known wrecks in the Irrawaddy, Chindwin and Mayu rivers enumerates 254 known ferrets. Between 50 and 100 of these were formerly steamers of the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company.

A report of January states that in the region from Hamsada Southward on the Irrawaddy and along the route to Rangoon there are no steamers; most river transport is by country boat. The same is undoubtedly true of other sections of the river system. However, the ready construction and manning of country boats probably enabled the Japanese to transport a considerable weight of freight by this means. It should be noted that certain important ferries, as those at Moulmein, Prome, and Sagaing, are of great importance in the Japanese transport system and thus are apt targets for our operations.

IIIECONOMICSOIL

The economic problem of most immediate military concern to the Japanese is the exploitation of Burma's oil resources. It has been estimated that at the end of 1943 the Japs were getting some 1770 barrels of oil a day from Burma's wells, which yielded a daily gasoline output of 12,600 gallons.

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Mandalay-Ishio.

Ten locomotives were observed at Maymyo on January 8th. This branch line is evidently in use. The Gotketh viaduct 35 miles Northeast of Maymyo was seen to be intact on January 21st.

Sagging-Ye-U.

The most vulnerable part of this important line of communication to the Chinwin has been the Mu River Bridge. The main bridge was knocked out on January 1st, and was still down on February 7th, but photographic cover of February 7th showed an alternate bridge as probably serviceable, and three small railroad bridges to the North of the main bridge were intact.

Other important bridges on this line have been hit. Recent reports on their state of service indicate that some of them are currently out of use.

Nyaungbinwun, 34 miles from Mandalay, was destroyed on January 1st. But photos of January 2nd show an alternate rail bridge under construction.

Alogappa, 48 miles from Mandalay, intact on February 7th.

Alon, 84 miles from Mandalay, intact on February 7th.

Songon, 94 miles from Mandalay, seen to be down on February 13th.

Dadalai, 99 miles from Mandalay, damaged on February 8th.

Tindeinyan, 124 miles from Mandalay, intact on February 7th.

Chantha, 129 miles from Mandalay and five miles from the terminus at Ye-U, intact on February 7th.

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Rangoon-Prome.

Photographic cover of the 47 miles between Minkha and Padigan (about one-third of this section) shows the through line and all bridges intact, but the Nattalin Bridge, 37 miles South of Prome, was out on January 21st. A report of early January states that one train a day runs between Rangoon and Prome, and it is probable that railway service is kept up despite the destruction of some of the bridges on this and other lines.

Honzada-Bassein-Kyangin.

The former train ferry across the Irrawaddy at Honzada has not been in use since the evacuation of Burma. This segment is evidently being operated by the two locomotives left on the line during the first Japanese advance, and their destruction might cause a complete standstill in the traffic here. Information of January indicates that one train a day each way is operated between Honzada and Bassein.

Pyinmana-Kyawkpadaung.

Recent information on this line is lacking. The Taungdaing Bridge, 67 miles Northwest of Pyinmana, was intact on February 6th and Kantha Bridge, 16 miles Northwest of Pyinmana, was intact on January 10th.

Thazi-Iyinyan-Paleik.

Part of this line appears to have been dismantled. The bridges West of Tada-U have been taken down, according to photographs of January 13th. However, the section from Paleik to Tada-U (7 miles) is still in use and the line from Thazi to beyond Iyinyan is also in use. The Tada-U Bridge was seen to be intact on January 20th and the Myetha Bridge, 27 miles Southwest of Paleik, was intact on January 24th.

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CSH/RL New Delhi Office

bridges were intact. Only seven to ten locomotives were identified but it is apparent that Japanese camouflage methods have prevented other locomotives from observation.

Ava Bridge

This bridge is still down; some of the traffic from the road proceeds across the Irrawaddy from the rail point Tada-U, by road to the Ava-Logyi area, and thence by barge to Bngning.

Bngning Myitkyina

A photoreconnaissance was made on December 22nd of sections of the whole of this main line between Bngning and Myitkyina. In this section, it was noted that twelve to 15 trains were running and 3000 rolling stock were visible along the line. This was noted as another indication that most of the line is still open.

There are three main bridges over the Irrawaddy, of which about 100 are in use. Recent reports on bomb damage to the line state that none of them is out of service. The bridge at Bngning, however, has been out of commission at least since December 10th, 40 miles West-Southwest of Myitkyina, was damaged by a bomb on January 10th but was bombed out of service. The bridge at Bngning and now bridge are under construction and are expected to be completed in February 4th.

At the 100 miles South of Myitkyina, the bridge was damaged on January 20th and 30th. At Loflaw, 10 miles South of Bngning, the bridge was still down on December 20th; an alternate route was visible on January 10th but unserviceable on January 20th. The bridge at Loflaw was visible on February 4th. A large locomotive is reported to be in the vicinity of Wuntho, 10 miles South of Myitkyina. The bridge at Loflaw, 200 miles South of Myitkyina, showed the normal flow of traffic on February 4th. The bridge at Loflaw, 200 miles South of Myitkyina, showed the normal flow of traffic on February 4th. The bridge at Loflaw, 200 miles South of Myitkyina, showed the normal flow of traffic on February 4th.

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Sittang Bridge.

In early December a considerable body of Japanese troops crossed the Sittang by means of a launch towing a wooden flat. This ferry service is probably still in use, although at least one of the bridges is now serviceable.

The Sittang Bridge, originally demolished during the evacuation, has been in the process of repair since October. By January 20th it was serviceable; on February 7th it was still intact. The North bridge is being dismantled; this was noted on January 28th and further dismantling was indicated in photos of February 6th.

Sittang-Pegu-Rangoon.

There is no information to indicate that this section is not in operation.

Rangoon-Mandalay.

The most vulnerable part of this section, the main line of the Burma Railways, has been the Myittha Bridge South of Mandalay. This bridge has been attacked scores of times and has been hit squarely over and over again, but on January 18th the original bridge had been restored to serviceable condition. Photographs of January 20th and 21st showed that the two alternate rail bridges which had been built in the vicinity were also complete. Hence, the Japanese now have a choice of three routes across the Myittha River. As for the other bridges on this section, the Sinthe Bridge, 135 miles South of Mandalay, was observed to be intact on January 20th; the Myittha Bridge, 40 miles South of Mandalay, was unserviceable on January 23rd.

The most extensive recent coverage occurred on January 18th when the line from Toungoo to Mandalay, a distance of 225 miles, was photographed. On that date the through line and all

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Photographic cover from Thanbyusayat to Mile 156 on January 15th showed the through line and all bridges intact. Fourteen trains were observed, three of them with two locomotives, but only three of the trains photographed were in motion. Some 37 or 38 locomotives were observed. Work on blast wall shelters and discharging areas was much in evidence.

More complete photographic cover which included all but about 20 miles of this line again showed the line and all bridges intact, with 40 locomotives and 625 rolling stock appearing in the photographs. There were 12 trains, seven of them in motion.

Thantabin.

A cover of the Se-ming section of the line from Thanbyusayat to Moulmein on February 3rd showed four locomotives and 430 rolling stock. There has been a considerable turn-over of rolling stock on this section, indicating continual traffic. Most of the rolling stock is concentrated at Moulmein.

Moulmein-Martaban Ferry.

The ferry across the S. I. River is in use. A number of new sidings and barge bays have been constructed at Moulmein for the dispersal of rolling stock brought in over the Burma-Siam link. At Moulmein also there has been a growing amount of coastal shipping. Obviously the Japanese are carrying some of the freight directly from the coast to Moulmein and to other ports.

Martaban-Moulmein.

A photographic cover of February 11th showed the through line and all bridges intact. In this date the sidings were almost empty, indicating recent movement of rolling stock Northward.

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Burma-Siam.

This line was opened in early September and at first had a capacity of only one train a day. But the line was in use months before the date of final completion. Troops were hauled over as much of the link as was completed, and then marched to the rail head on the western side. A recently captured diary belonging to a soldier of the 143rd Infantry Regiment, 55th Division, tells that he arrived at Danpong in Thailand on May 24th. He crossed to Burma by a combination of railroad, motor transport, and marching. It is probable that the 54th Division, now posted along the Southwest coast, was brought into Burma by this route.

The new line uses the Burmese-Southern Railway from the port of Moulmein directly South for 35 miles to Thanbyu-sayat. From there the new construction runs East and Southeast through the Three Pagodas Pass, down through the Khwae Noi River Valley to Kanchanaburi and Danpong in Thailand. At Danpong it connects with the main Thai Railway leading Southward to Singapore and Northeast to Bangkok. The total distance from Moulmein to Bangkok is 320 miles. The new rail link is about 235 miles long.

Photographic reconnaissance of this line at the end of December 1943 noted a considerable increase in traffic. A 60-mile cover revealed ten trains, 17 locomotives and 200 wagons. In January the road paralleling the rail line was found to be double-tracked and hard surfaced for the first 118 miles East of Thanbyu-sayat. From that point on, construction is still in progress but the road is now serviceable throughout. In many places sidings and spurs are being built for ease of dispersal. The facilities for servicing do not seem to be adequate for through train operation.

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From the Capital, the Bangoon-Mandalay-Myittha main line carries supplies and reinforcements to the northern fronts in the Hukawng, Sumprabum and Salween regions.

Over the branch line to the West, Bangoon-Prone, go men and materials for the Arakan front. They proceed from the region of Prone across the pass to Taungup, and then by road and boat to Akyab. A newly built motor road, complete except for a portion of 20 miles, now extends from Taungup up to Kynaktaw on the Kaladan River. This road greatly improves Japanese communications to the Arakan area.

The Henzada-Dusseini-Kyangin segment of the railroad is isolated from Bangoon by the break across the Irrawaddy near Henzada, but it plays an important part in maintaining the defenses of the Southwest coast of the country.

Another branch line to the West, the Thasi-Myingyan spur, is one of the stages along the line of communication to the Myittha Valley and the Chin Hills. Supplies are taken by boat from the rail point at Myingyan to Pakokku and then by road along the route Pauk-Tilin-Gangaw.

The Chinawin front is supplied from the northern division of the main line. Two routes seem to be mainly used, one reaching from the rail point Wuntko by motor road to Pinlebu, which is probably the Headquarters of the 15th Division, then to Wayongon and thence by track to Paungbyin on the Chinawin.

Another line of communication to the Chinawin extends from the rail point Indaw by motor road through Darnauk to Pinbon, where the Headquarters of the 31st Division is located. The motor road has been built to Naungkat, from which point an improved track leads to Sitsark and then to Nawngya Awng on the Uya River.

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022/141 New Delhi Office

estimate of October 22, 1943, gave the total number of locomotives in operation in Burma as 166. Although there have been losses of locomotives since, with the new source of supply the Japanese have enough locomotives for their needs. But they do not have more than enough, especially since the bombing of November 27 gutted the locomotive workshops at Insein, North of Rangoon. This workshop contained the only machinery in Burma capable of undertaking major boiler repairs and the essential wheel lathes were also located here. Hence, locomotives remain a prime target for our attacks, and also a potential weakness in Japan's transport schedules.

The destruction of bridges has not hampered the railway system more than temporarily. All important railway bridges up to the time of writing have been restored, with the exception of the Ava Bridge mentioned above, although hundreds of determined and successful attacks have been made by our planes and ground forces. The Japanese have been able to accomplish this by perseverant rebuilding of demolished structures and the building of alternate bridges at important places. Sometimes it is only a few days between repair and re-destruction, but the Japanese have been able to keep rail transport operating continuously.

To supply each front the Japanese use a different combination of transport media. The railroad is the prime mover, extended by road, river, coastal, and animal transport. The main flow of men and materials now proceeds via the Burma - Siam Railroad into Rangoon, the main supply depot. There has been a great deal of activity at Rangoon in the construction and enlargement of stores and dumps during the latter half of 1943. This activity has been largely confined to the area North of the city extending to the region North of Mincaladen. This storage space is now estimated at between 500,000 and 800,000 tons, which would represent about one year's reserve of supported stores for the Japanese forces in Burma.

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have been built up in the vicinity of Rangoon and ancillary depots are scattered throughout the country.

The most important transport innovation that the Japanese have effected has been the completion of the Burma - Siam Railroad linking the Burmese system with that of Thailand. The importance of this link, from a political point of view, is summarized by a British source in these words: "The completion of this railroad has very obvious and important political and economic repercussions. It means that a certain amount of Burma's surplus production and a certain amount of Japanese goods can be put back on the market. It means that the Japanese desire for our return may also be met."

From a military point of view, the opening of this new line is equally important. It improves the Japanese military position in that military supplies can be routed overland with much less delay and in a greatly reduced time period than had heretofore been possible. From the Burmese terminal of the line, the flow of goods and supplies can flow in a steady stream to the eastward.

In addition to the new line, only one major bridge has remained down for any length of time. The Ava Bridge across the Irrawaddy near Mandalay has been closed for some time. The danger of attacks on trains by mobile enemy air units. The blasting of bridges has been countered by mobile repair units and by the building of alternate bridges. The movement of heavy guns and rolling stock has been partially maintained by the use of trucks and by the erecting of numerous temporary bridges and trestles.

As of the time of writing, the railway system since the war has been in a state of disrepair. Reports have recently come in of the building of a new type of locomotive in

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To the South of the 56th Division, three Thai divisions garrison the border territories between Burma and Thailand.

7. WEST COAST - BASSEIN

The newly arrived 54th Division is responsible for the defense of the coast South of Akyab, and probably for the Bassein District. Its divisional headquarters may be at Mawdaing, 18 miles South of Prome. The 54th is made up of the 11th, the 112th and 154th Regiments. Strong defenses are being built along the west coasts of Ramree and Cheduba Islands. But there is apparently only one regiment stationed South of the line Hanzada - Gwa, including the Bassein River territory. This part of the coast seems to be rather thinly held.

Forecast

Thai military circles, according to a report classified as from a usually reliable source and probably true, expect the Japanese to undertake an offensive soon against Northeastern India. The offensive is scheduled to develop when the 21st Division reaches Burma, and is to be directed against the Brahmaputra Valley.

II COMMUNICATIONS

Both Japanese offensive power and defensive strength in Burma depend to a considerable degree on their ability to uphold communications, and especially to maintain their railway system. Many months of daily hammering at the Burma railroads by our planes have forced the Japanese to resort to a variety of defensive measures. Most of them appear to have achieved their purpose. The Burma railroads are not operating at full capacity by any means, but they are functioning well enough to keep the Japanese army fairly adequately supplied. Great supply stores

SECRET**Original Not to be Destroyed**

made into a large troop and supply center. The Japanese have been hard at work improving lateral and parallel trails along the main routes, presumably with the intention of insuring superior freedom of movement for their forces when hostilities occur in this area. There seems to be at least 7,000 Japanese troops in the Mogoke-Kamming strip, with perhaps 4,000 more North of Kamming. These troops are probably from the 18th Division. The 55th Regiment and the 56th Regiment of the 18th are already in or near the line with the 114th Regiment reported to be moving in from the Salween.

A report of January 18th states that the troops in the Mogoke-Kamming territory comprised seven battalions of the 18th Division.

It may be that additional reinforcements destined for the Hukawng front are coming from the 56th Division on the Salween and from the 18th Division, parts of which are on the Chindwin.

5. SURPRUM

Japanese communications from Myitkyina to their northernmost outposts in the Surprum region continue to be harassed by our patrols and by Levy ambushes. It has been reported that there are 1,000 Japanese at Haungshka, a few miles North of Myitkyina.

6. SALWEEN

The Japanese are seemingly content with their positions along the Salween, being engaged in improving their defenses there. The 56th Division is responsible for this front; its component regiments are the 113th, the 146th and the 148th. Divisional Headquarters are at Lanching or at Hainingshih. There is some evidence that troops have been moved from this area toward Myitkyina.

A single report of January, which must be taken with reserve until confirmed, states that three thousand troops of the 57th Division have recently arrived in the Mangshih area.

SECRET**ONS/MA New Delhi office**

over, there has recently been considerable motor traffic and other Japanese activity in the Kalamyo region, just behind the Chin front.

Japanese units in this sector have been identified as belonging to the 33rd Division. The 215th Regiment is in position as well as two battalions of the 214th Regiment, and possibly the 2nd Battalion of the 213th Regiment. Here, as elsewhere, Irregulars are aiding the Japanese.

3. CHINDWIN

Combat actions in this sector have been restricted to the Yu River region where our troops, operating from the direction of Tamu, have pushed the enemy back of Kynukahaw (15 airline miles Northwest of Pantha on the Chindwin). Our forces have also advanced Southward along the stream called Dathwaykyauk Chaung.

It is in this area that the most notable enemy reinforcements have been made. The 15th Division appears to be coming in to take over the section of the Chindwin opposite Tamu, with Divisional Headquarters at Pinlobu. The 31st Division will then take over the line of the Chindwin North of Paungtyin, with Divisional Headquarters at Sakhon.

This heavy reinforcement, together with the evidence of extraordinary road building leading up to the Chindwin, and extensive water transport flotillas gathered at points along the Chindwin indicates intentions of an impending offensive.

4. HUKAWNG

The Chinese continue to press on slowly but steadily in this sector, having now advanced beyond Taro and Taipha Ga. However, there are many reports of extensive Japanese reinforcements in this area; reinforcements which have not yet been brought into action. The territory along the Mogaung - Kamaing Road has been

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The Japanese evidently planned to repeat their successful manoeuvres of last year in this area, when British forces withdrew after being outflanked. To the present date, they have succeeded only insofar as the flanking movement itself was brought off. The 1st Battalion of the 213th Regiment had been reported on the move from Kyauktaw to the East of the present combat area, but instead of proceeding North as had been expected, they rapidly crossed Westward to appear behind our lines.

Japanese units in the Arakan region (at Akyab and to the North) have been identified as belonging to the 55th and to the 33rd Divisions. Three regiments of the 55th have been spotted, the 143rd, the 112th and the recently reorganized 144th. Of the 33rd Division, the 215th Regiment has been identified as well as the 2nd Battalion of the 214th.

The present offensive has been loudly ballyhooed over the Japanese controlled radio as the opening move in an offensive designed to take Chittagong. It has been heralded as the battle debut of the Indian Independence Army under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose. Chittagong, according to the propaganda line, is only a way station along Bose's road to Delhi.

More practically, according to a competent estimate, it seems that the Japanese may have decided that the threat of an Allied seaborne expedition, particularly one directed against Akyab Island, is by now almost negligible. Therefore they have accepted the risk of disposing a considerable number of troops in the forward areas.

2. THE CHIN HILLS

Since November when the enemy occupied the three main towns in this area (Haka, Falam, and Fort White) the Japanese have been held along a line South and East of Tiddim. Enemy detachments have made attempts to force, or to bypass, the British position on Kennedy Peak, South of Tiddim, without success. How-

SECRET**CONFIDENTIAL**

Japanese air strength in Southeast Asia, including Burma, Siam, Malaya, French Indo-China, and Sumatra, numbers approximately 340 army planes and 120 naval aircraft of all types. This represents a slight increase in recent weeks, and may include some of the new type of fighter plane, the Tojo.

The recent developments on the major fronts in Burma are summarized as follows: -

1. **ARAKAN**

Our progress in this sector has been impeded temporarily by the sudden appearance of the Japanese in strength behind the front. British forces had been pushing the enemy back from positions astride the road between Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Our troops in Maungdaw are supplied by a North-South road from Bawli Bazaar. To the East of this road, along the other side of the Mayu Ridge, there is another North-South line of communication leading to Buthidaung from Taung Bazaar. An important lateral connection between these two North-South lines of communication is the road over the Ngakyedonk Pass. By a quick flank movement the Japanese had blocked off the Eastern end of this pass and were raiding our transport on the North-South roads. At the time of writing they have been pushed back from the Bawli Bazaar - Maungdaw Road and have evacuated Taung Bazaar, and the pass is being cleared.

British and Indian troops, aided by tanks and air support, stood firm against the Japanese attack. The attacking forces have been identified as the 118th Regiment of the 55th Division (engaged Southwest of Taung Bazaar) and elements of the 218th Regiment of the 55th Division (engaged along the Bawli Bazaar - Maungdaw Road); both were aided by strong JIF (Japanese Inspired Forces) Irregulars. Later a battalion of the 148th Regiment was sent in to reinforce the 118th.

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I MILITARY OPERATIONS

Three new Divisions have recently appeared in Burma, with a fourth and possibly a fifth reported en route. This is in addition to the four Japanese Divisions which have previously garrisoned the country. Several competent sources agree that the Japanese seem to be preparing for an offensive move. The attack on the Arakan front (the zero hour for which was moved forward by the Japanese Command) may be the preliminary step in a larger plan. Japanese troops are now disposed in such a manner as to be able to operate offensively either across the Chindwin and then towards Imphal, or to move North in the Hukawng Valley towards Lado. It is possible that their plan calls for both operations with the ultimate view of neutralizing our air installations in the Brahmaputra Valley.

This plan would be entirely in keeping with the Japanese theory of "active defense" and with their standard practice of employing wide flanking movements both tactically and strategically. Thus the main thrust might come initially in the Chindwin Sector, while the enemy remained relatively passive in the Myittha area. Then the plan might call for a reversal of the ratio of offensive pressure with an attempt made to swing around our forces in the North (the Japanese have been very busy on roads and trails in this area) and then an advance in the Lado direction.

It has been estimated that six Japanese divisions in Burma represent a total Army strength of 130,000 men. Two more divisions augment that number appreciably. To this must be added some eight battalions of the "Burma National Army", the members of various labor corps, some Indian troops of the "India Independence Army" and a considerable number of JIFS, Irregulars under Japanese leadership and pay.

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OSS/NSA New Delhi Office

BURMA
SITUATION REPORT NO. 1

The Japanese have strengthened their position in Burma during recent weeks. They have made some local advances in the Arakan Sector. They have accomplished a large scale reinforcement of their forces in most areas of Burma. They have been able to maintain and, in certain respects, even to improve their transport system. They have built up great supply depots. Ba Maw's puppet government finds no effective opposition within the country.

Against these efforts must be counted the spheres of Allied success. Chinese troops have pushed Japanese back in the Hukawng region. Our Air Forces continue to hold a considerable margin of superiority over Japanese attempts to intercept our bombers and to halt the air flow into China. There has been a continued deterioration of the economic position of Burma's civilian population. Japanese counter strokes by air bombardment and by propaganda media against our bases in India have met with little success.

In all their recent achievements, the Japanese have faithfully followed the same patterns of tactical, strategic and propaganda manoeuvre which they have employed since the beginning of the war. The following review of current developments in Burma will indicate opportunities for further intelligence and operational projects.

SECRET

INDIA SITUATION REPORT NO. 1

CSS, R & A, New Delhi

23 February 1944

C O N T E N T S

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SECRET**OSS/PA New Data Office**

This report has been prepared for the use of OSS branches. It is based on information available up to the middle of February 1944. Some aspects of the Japanese occupation of Burma have been very briefly treated or entirely omitted. Subsequent reports will amplify the presentation of such topics and make necessary revisions in the data as further intelligence becomes available and as operations proceed.